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NOTE
RETHINKING "JUST" COMPENSATION: DIGNITY
RESTORATION AS A BASIS FOR SUPPLEMENTING
EXISTING TAKINGS REMEDIES WITH
GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED COMMUNITY
BUILDING INITIATIVES
Alyssa M. Hasbrouckt
INTRODUCTION
"We have to give a damn. We have to give a damn about
people staying in their home. We have to give a damn about
poor and working-class folks, and about seniors who want to
spend their sunset years in the homes that they know and
love. We have to care, and our policies will follow our
compassion."'
- Professor Tanya Washington,
Georgia State University College of Law
Soon after the Constitution was ratified, the Bill of Rights
enshrined certain fundamental protections for individuals.
The Fifth Amendment is among those crucial safeguards.
Through its Takings Clause, the Fifth Amendment guarantees,
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation." 2
Even though the Takings Clause may appear straightfor-
ward, the extent to which it restricts government action has
t B.A., Yale University, 2014; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2019; Notes Editor,
Comell Law Review, Vol. 104. I would like to thank Professor Laura Underkuffler
for her unwavering confidence in me and for encouraging me throughout the
process of writing this Note. Without her thoughtful feedback, this Note would
not exist. Further, my thanks to Susan Green Pado and my colleagues on the
Cornell Law Review for their diligent work on this Note during the publication
process. Special thanks to Madelaine Horn, Doug Wagner, and Bryan Magee for
selflessly going above and beyond to prepare this Note for publication, and for
their intellectual camaraderie and support. Lastly, thank you to my parents-for
your unconditional love and support since day one.
1 Cliff Albright, Gentrification Is Sweeping Through America. Here Are the
People Fighting Back, GuARDIAN (Nov. 10, 2017, 5:00 AM) (quoting Tanya Washing-
ton), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/nov/10/atlanta-super-gen
trification-eminent-domain [http://perma.ce/EJ2C-YKFN].
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
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been controversial.3 Especially following the Supreme Court's
decision in Kelo v. City of New London,4 lawmakers and schol-
ars alike have hotly debated the scope of the public use re-
quirement.5 Today, legislatures regularly invoke some version
of "public use" when exercising the eminent domain power,
seizing private land to build projects ranging from public
parks 6 and hospitals7 to privately owned sports arenas" and
manufacturing plants.9
In stark contrast, the Takings Clause's just compensation
requirement has been ignored almost as much as the public
use requirement has been scrutinized.' 0 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has largely abided by a singular notion of just compensa-
tion for more than a century: "just compensation is commonly
considered the fair market value of the property at the time of
the taking."' As a result, judges have rarely deviated from the
fair market value standard. 1 2 But while just compensation
doctrine has remained stagnant at the judicial level, scholars
3 See Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain's Political
Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 239-41 (2006).
4 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
5 See Lopez, supra note 3, at 241, n.23.
6 See Man Fights to Retain His Property Although City Claims Eminent Do-
main, CBS 46 (Aug. 7, 2018), http://www.cbs46.com/story/38826565/man-
fights-to-retain-his-property-although-city-claims-eminent-domain [https://per
ma.cc/32SQ-5YX3].
7 See Payne Horning, Eminent Domain Court Battle Looms over Utica Hospital
Project, WRVO PUB. MEDIA (July 19, 2018), http://www.wrvo.org/post/eminent-
domain-court-battle-looms-over-utica-hospital-project [https://perma.cc/5RKQ-
6FDT].
8 See Charles V. Bagli, Ruling Lets Atlantic Yards Seize Land, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 24, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/25/nyregion/25yards.html
[https://perma.cc/YVG5-W4J7].
9 See Rikki Mitchell, Mount Pleasant May Take Remaining Properties in Fox-
conn Area Through Eminent Domain, TMJ4 (May 9, 2018, 10:14 PM), https://www
.tmj4.com/news/local-news/mount-pleasant-may-take-remaining-properties-in-
foxconn-area-through-eminent-domain [https://perma.cc/3RPG-ZM2G].
10 See Lopez, supra note 3, at 239.
11 Elisabeth Sperow, The Kelo Legacy: Political Accountability, Not Legislation,
Is the Cure, 38 McGEORGE L. REv. 405, 408 (2007) (first citing United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1945); then citing Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246
(1934)).
12 The Court has occasionally deviated from this standard when addressing
injuries caused by the taking of intangible property. See Shubha Ghosh, Toward
a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property: The Path Left Open After
College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 637, 670-71 (2000)
("Intangible property, as well as real property, is special for the purposes of the
Takings Clause. . . . The right to earn interest on principal is an intangible
property interest. The Court has found it to be a special interest worthy of protec-
tion under the Takings Clause."). However, the fair market value standard for the
taking of real property has remained inflexible. See infra subpart I.A.
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have long questioned the wisdom of fair market value as a
meaningful tool of justice.' 3
This Note joins those criticisms. However, while existing
scholarship has merely proposed alternative measures of fi-
nancial compensation, 14 this Note contends that justice is fully
served only when the government embraces nonmonetary
means of compensation as a way to supplement existing mone-
tary remedies.' 5 Money damages are a logical fix for economic
injuries, but money only goes so far. Where displaced individu-
als are also subjected to dignitary harms, the government only
fulfills its obligation to provide just compensation through the
process of dignity restoration.
To illustrate the need for a broader understanding of just
compensation, this Note turns to America's long history of
blight condemnations and urban renewal. Part I provides an
overview of relevant Takings Clause jurisprudence and contex-
tualizes our understanding of just compensation in relation to
the ever-evolving public use doctrine. It then examines existing
criticisms of the fair market value standard, before situating
dignity as a value inherent within those criticisms and as a
constitutional value already recognized by the courts. Building
on that background, Part II applies Professor Bernadette
13 See James W. Ely, Jr., The Historical Context of Just Compensation, PRAC.
REAL EST. LAw., May 2014, at 9, 14-15 (first citing W. Harold Bigham, "Fair Market
Value," "Just Compensation," and the Constitution: A Critical View, 24 VAND. L.
REV. 63, 67 (1970) ("To the extent that the existing use of the fair market value test
prohibits compensation for consequential damages, however, the landowners [sic]
compensation is inadequate, and he is in fact paying more than his fair share.");
then citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 51-56, 182-186 (1985) ("The central difficulty of the market value
formula for explicit compensation, therefore, is that it denies any compensation
for real but subjective values."); and then citing United States v. Norwood, 602
F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging that "just compensation' tends
systematically to undercompensate the owners of property taken by eminent do-
main" and describing the Supreme Court's approval of this shortfall as "a conclu-
sion rather than a reason").
14 See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Do-
main, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 148 (2006) (discussing existing scholarship and
noting that "even accurate valuation methods may fail to make owners whole").
15 The Takings Clause applies to the federal government and state govern-
ments. See Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239-41 (1897).
Notably, the Takings Clause was the first provision from the Bill of Rights to be
incorporated, through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, as ap-
plicable to the states. See Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation
of State Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 551, 604 (2003). To the extent that Chicago interprets the
Takings Clause beyond the meaning that was intended at the time of ratification,
the Supreme Court has long recognized that the meaning of the Takings Clause,
including the just compensation requirement, continuously evolves.
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Atuahene's "dignity takings" thesis to urban renewal and ur-
ban displacement, exposing the dire need to broaden the
meaning ofjust compensation. It then argues that government
actors are constitutionally obligated to support neighborhood-
based initiatives aimed at restoring dignity to the communities
traditionally uprooted by urban redevelopment and proposes
several ways that the government can fulfill this obligation.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Eminent Domain, Urban Renewal, and Balancing the
Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause reads, "[Nior shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation."' 6 Applicable to eminent domain, the government's
power to seize private property for public use in exchange for
compensation, 1 7 these few words distilled centuries of common
law into two brief requirements: public use and just compensa-
tion." Although the Takings Clause's meaning has been de-
bated, its dual requirements are generally understood to work
together.' 9 As a result, it is necessary to consider how public
use has evolved in order to fully understand the present state
of just compensation. 20
16 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
17 See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1875) ("The proper view of
the right of eminent domain seems to be, that it is a right belonging to a sover-
eignty to take private property for its own public uses, and not for those of
another."); George Galgano, Note, Just Compensation for Per Se Environmental
Takings, 16 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 217, 220 (1998) ("[T]hrough the process of emi-
nent domain, ... legal title to private property is transferred to the government in
exchange for compensation to the property owner." (footnote omitted)).
18 See Ely, Jr., supra note 13, at 9 (tracing the roots of the Takings Clause to
foundational English legal documents such as the Magna Carta).
19 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme
Court Failed to Clean Up Takings Law in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 151, 184-85 (2017) ("The just compensation requirement of the [Takings
[CIlause was designed as an intermediate position between two unpalatable ex-
tremes: at the one end, the government could take property without any compen-
sation, at which point individual property owners would be subject to the abuses
of a dominant majority faction. At the other end, the property could be taken only
with the express consent of the property owner, at which point the holdout prob-
lem would become insurmountable. . . . (The just] compensation require-
ment . . . prevents abuse at one end of the takings equation while inducing
responsible behavior on the other.").
20 See Lopez, supra note 3, at 242 ("The Article concludes that a broader
assessment of the individual losses associated with eminent domain, even though
they are subjective, resuscitates the word 'just' in 'just compensation' and brings
the eminent domain balance closer to a point of equipoise."); id. at 283 ("[Wihile
the scope of the public use definition changed over time, the interpretation of
1050
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The Supreme Court made its most recent major statement
on public use in 2005's Kelo v. City of New London, which
followed decades of judicial deference towards eminent do-
main. 2 1 Considered by many to be the high-water mark of
permissible government takings, Kelo significantly broadened
the scope of public use, expanding the term to apply to a mere
"public purpose."22 Plaintiff Susette Kelo challenged New
London's attempt to seize her home for the purpose of building
a commercial district on the razed property. 23 Pharmaceutical
giant Pfizer had announced plans to construct a research facil-
ity in New London, and the city hoped that the increased traffic
Pfizer brought would spur economic growth in the city's new
commercial district. 24
In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled in favor of New London,
holding that economic development is a sufficient public pur-
pose, and thus public use, to satisfy the Takings Clause.25 The
Court's dissenters viewed this conclusion with alarm.2 6 As
Justice O'Connor pointed out, "[N]early any lawful use of real
private property can be said to generate some incidental benefit
to the public."2 7 Consequently, the majority's interpretation of
public use could be understood as "not realistically exclud[ing]
any takings."28
Almost immediately, politicians, scholars, and concerned
citizens across the nation responded with outrage to Kelo's vast
potential for abuse:
Political cartoons portrayed the Kelo majority as (among
other things) a modem-day Ku Klux Klan, as a wrecking-ball
knocking down a home with the owner still inside, and as a
blood-stained butcher hacking the heart out of the Constitu-
tion with a cleaver. The case consistently polled with a disap-
proval rating of over 80%.29
what constitutes just compensation' petrified. The diverging evolutions of the two
clauses have had a profound effect on the modem balance between the ...
[values] contemplated by the Takings Clause... .").
21 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
22 See id. at 483-484, 484 n.13.
23 See id. at 473-75.
24 See id. at 474-75.
25 See id. at 483-84.
26 See id. at 498-99 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
27 See id. at 501.
28 See id.
29 Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property and Politics, NEW RAMBLER, http://newramb
lerreview.com/book-reviews/law/property-and-politics [https://perma.cc/QJ68-
8ZC71 (reviewing ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: Kelo v. City of New London and
the Limits of Eminent Domain (2015)).
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The widespread anger over Kelo reached "across the political
spectrum in a way that-even a decade later-is remarkable."3 0
State governments quickly enacted legislation to restrict Kelo's
scope, and, as of 2015, forty-five states had passed "anti-Kelo
legislation." 3 1
Even before anti-Kelo legislation, however, Kelo's broad
definition of public use did little to change existing law. 3 2 In
many ways, the pre-Kelo legal scheme was equally troubling.
For decades before Kelo, legislatures had wielded eminent do-
main as a favored tool for urban condemnation and redevelop-
ment.3 3 Post-Kelo legislation merely restored this already
destructive status quo. 3 4 Undaunted, legislatures have used
and continue to use eminent domain to target and displace
minority communities, thinly justified by a veneer of "public
use."
Indeed, Kelo stands as a testament to a century's worth of
urban blight-clearance efforts and redevelopment policies
stretching back to the City Beautiful movement, which
emerged at the turn of the twentieth century.35 At that time,
during the height of the Second Industrial Revolution, cities
became increasingly noisy, dirty, and crowded, as factories-
and factory workers-multiplied.3 6 In response, longtime ur-
30 Id.
31 Most of these acts were passed within the first three years after Kelo. See
Ilya Somin, Opinion, The Political and Judicial Reaction to Kelo, WASH. POST (June
4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2015/06/04/the-political-and-judicial-reaction-to-kelo/ [https://perma.cc/
7KPA-WYH4].
32 See Pefialver, supra note 29 (noting that Kelo did not change existing law
and paraphrasing Somin's interpretation of Kelo as "consistent with longstanding
precedent").
33 See Andrea J. Boyack, Side By Side: Revitalizing Urban Cores and Ensuring
Residential Diversity, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 435, 458 (2017).
34 See Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the
Psychology of Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker
Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 713, 714 (2008) ("Some commentators argue
that many states have adopted reforms where 'blight' exceptions are so broad that
the law provides virtually no protection at all against economic development tak-
ings."); id. at 724.
35 More precisely, City Beautiful coalesced following the 1893 World's Colum-
bian Exhibition in Chicago. See Dessa Marie Dal Porto, Note, La Piccola Italia
Invisible: Washington D.C.'s Invisible Little Italy, 11 GEO. PUB. POLY REv. 15, 17
(2006).
36 See Sidney F. Ansbacher et al., Florida's Downtowns Are Free to Grow Local
Broccoli ... and Chickens (Sometimes), 11 FLA. A&M U. L. REv. 1, 32-33 (2015)
("[Alt the start of the industrial revolution[,] [o]vercrowding in the cities was a
paramount concern since it impacted numerous public health, safety and welfare
issues (e.g., spread of disease and fire)." (quoting Patricia E. Salkin, From Euclid to
Growing Smart: The Transformation of the American Local Land Use Ethic into
1052 [Vol. 104:1047
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ban elites fled the cities, seeking "suburban space and free-
dom." 3 7 These elites became the reformers behind "City
Beautiful."3 8
The City Beautiful movement was "premised on the notion
that civic revitalization, and ultimately social progress, could
be achieved by beautification and sanitation regimes with at-
tention to landscape design, municipal improvement and civic
configuration." 39 In particular, the movement "focused largely
on planning city parks, landscaping urban waterways, and de-
signing attractive spaces for public buildings." 40 Through
these beautification efforts, reformers "hoped to inspire and
empower the poor to a level of moral and civic virtue."4 1 They
aimed to clean up overcrowded, dirty tenements and slums,
and to restore a clean and healthy way of life to city residents. 42
The City Beautiful movement crystallized years of urban
beautification efforts that had resulted in landmarks such as
New York City's Central Park.43 Initially patronized by the
city's wealthiest residents, 44 Central Park was created as an
oasis from rapid urban development and the calamitousness of
city life.45 Towards that end, park construction efforts dis-
placed 1,600 poor and immigrant residents and demolished
"one of the city's most stable African-American settlements." 4 6
Local Land Use and Environmental Controls, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 110
(2002)).
37 See Dal Porto, supra note 35, at 17.
38 See Ansbacher et al., supra note 36, at 9-10 ("While the [City Beautiful]
movement emphasized green spaces, its leaders were patricians who saw food
gardens and soup kitchens for the poor as blight to be eradicated.").
39 Lolita Buckner Inniss, Back to the Future: Is Form-Based Code an Effica-
cious Tool for Shaping Modern Civic Life?, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 75, 85-86
(2007-08).
40 See Stephen Clowney, Note, A Walk Along WillarcL- A Revised Look at Land
Use Coordination in Pre-Zoning New Haven, 115 YALE L.J. 116, 128-29 (2005).
41 Dal Porto, supra note 35, at 17.
42 See Ansbacher et al., supra note 36, at 27 (noting that City Beautiful was
"the next step" in furthering earlier efforts to abate "moral nuisances" and
"sources of serious pollution").
43 Strictly speaking, the creation of Central Park predates the formal emer-
gence of City Beautiful. Nevertheless, the Park is often considered alongside City
Beautiful given its galvanizing influence on the movement. See Kristen David
Adams, Can Promise Enforcement Save Affordable Housing in the United States?,
41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 643, 716-17 (2004).
44 Elizabeth Blackmar & Roy Rosenzweig, History, CENTRALPARK.ORG, https://
centralpark.org/history-of-central-park/ [https://perma.cc/AR9V-WLLV] ("[Iln
the park's first decade more than half of its visitors arrived in carriages, costly
vehicles that fewer than five percent of the city's residents could afford to own.").
45 See Serena M. Williams, Sustaining Urban Green Spaces: Can Public Parks
Be Protected Under the Public Trust Doctrine?, 10 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 23, 27 (2002).
46 See Blackmar & Rosenzweig, supra note 44.
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As with the subsequent City Beautiful movement, these efforts
were justified as a way "to beat back urban blight '[iln a some-
what romantic effort to recapture the bucolic and putatively
more virtuous past of rural America.'" 4 7
Rooted in lofty ideals intended to enrich the lives of the
elite, City Beautiful did little to improve living conditions for
most city-dwellers. 4 8 Thus, urban planners quickly realized
the limited impact of City Beautiful's aesthetics-based ap-
proach and began to emphasize the so-called City Practical. 4 9
Shifting towards pragmatic rather than aesthetic reforms, cit-
ies began in earnest to zone polluted industrial sectors away
from residential areas.5 0 The Supreme Court's decision in
1926's Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.51 gave further
momentum to this effort. 52
In Euclid, the Supreme Court granted localities wide dis-
cretion to enact zoning schemes.5 3 So long as zoning ordi-
nances had a substantial relationship to public health and
safety concerns, per Euclid, they were presumptively constitu-
tional." Through this implicit endorsement of centralized ur-
ban planning, the Euclid Court began the legal reification of
policies that the City Beautiful movement had long advocated
for.5 5 Further, by validating urban planning undertaken for
health and safety reasons, Euclid laid the groundwork for the
mid-twentieth century redevelopment movement that was later
euphemistically christened "urban renewal."5 6
These ambitious beautification and aesthetic goals inter-
sected with the world of eminent domain in 1954's Berman v.
47 See Ansbacher et al., supra note 36, at 5 (quoting Richard H. Chused,
Euclid's Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 597, 602 (2001)).
48 See Clowney, supra note 40, at 129.
49 See Mark Fenster, Note, "A Remedy on Paper": The Role of Law in the
Failure of City Planning in New Haven, 1907-1913, 107 YALE L.J. 1093, 1104
(1998) ("[Bly 1907 [the City Beautiful movement] . . . was beginning to be ex-
panded into what was known as the 'City Practical' movement.").
50 See Inniss, supra note 39, at 86 ("[I1n response to concerns about building
uniformity, public health, safety and welfare, cities and towns began to develop
zoning codes.").
51 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
52 See Ansbacher et al., supra note 36, at 29 (noting the emergence of Euclid-
ean zoning schemes as a consequence of the City Beautiful movement).
53 See Inniss, supra note 39, at 87 ("Since Euclid, zoning ordinances bear a
presumption of validity.").
54 See JCL
55 See Ansbacher et al., supra note 36, at 29.
56 See Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" ofBlight: Urban Renewal and
the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POLY REv. 1, 12-13 (2003)
("ILleading urban reformers . . . would later argue that the Court's opinion [in
Euclid] supported the use of eminent domain for urban renewal.").
1054 [Vol. 104:1047
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Parker.5 7 The decision is credited with catalyzing the modem
expansion of "public use."5 8 For years after Euclid, and follow-
ing the Great Depression, idealistic zoning and urban redevel-
opment projects had proceeded in earnest.59 But:
As African-Americans began moving north following World
War I and II, federal and local governments began intention-
ally creating racial segregation through various public
projects such as urban renewal, public improvement, and
public housing programs, causing the "picture of the urban
ghetto . .. to develop." Local governments adopted racial
segregation as a de facto policy. Whites began pouring out of
the urban areas and into suburbia in a widespread pattern
termed "White flight." Industry began leaving the urban ar-
eas in favor of cheap land and tax incentives. Zoning ordi-
nances, designed to facilitate segregation, separated blocks
by race, and restrictive covenants allowed for legally backed
racial discrimination and segregation.60
Although the Supreme Court had declared explicit race-
based zoning illegal in 1917,61 it was against this racially hos-
tile backdrop that the justices adjudicated Berman. Only five
years earlier, the Housing Act of 1949's Title I had "called for
the elimination of slums by using public capital to acquire,
demolish, and clear blighted areas. Once cleared, the land was
to be transferred to the private sector for development." 6 2
Partly inspired by the not-too-distant memory of City Beautiful,
"[tihe original premise behind the [Act] was that improvements
to the physical surroundings of the city would produce urban
revitalization." 63 In the post-war years, these initiatives pro-
vided cover for authorities to condemn largely minority neigh-
57 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
58 See Joshua Brian Lanphear, Reconceptualizing "For Public Use" in the Af-
termath of Home v. Department of Agriculture, 94 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 1, 15
(2017).
59 See ALISON ISENBERG, DOwNTowN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE PLACE AND THE
PEOPLE WHO MADE IT 125 (2004) ("From the vantage point of later decades, the
depression is usually portrayed as a hiatus, an interruption to the otherwise
expansive long-term trends of twentieth-century metropolitan growth.").
60 Kate Meals, Comment, Nurturing the Seeds of Food Justice: Unearthing the
Impact of Institutionalized Racism on Access to Healthy Food in Urban African-
American Communities, 15 SCHOLAR 97, 118 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
61 See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60,81-82 (1917); Inniss, supra note 39,
at 88.
62 Ian S. Tattenbaum, Note, Renewal for the 1990s: An Analysis of New York
City Redevelopment Programs in Light of Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, 6 N.Y.U.
ENVrL. L.J. 220, 221 (1997).
63 Id.
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borhoods, forcing people out of their homes and entrenching
segregation.61
Perhaps in recognition of these systematic efforts to dis-
possess, dislocate, and segregate urban minorities, Congress
amended the Housing Act in 1954 to, among other things, eu-
phemistically rename Title I as "Urban Renewal."6 5 With this
change, Congress hoped to signal "that the goal of the 1949
Housing Act had evolved from slum clearance to slum preven-
tion/rehabilitation." 66 But even if Congress had intended to
implement genuine change, the Supreme Court's contempora-
neous decision in Berman did much to erase it.6 7 The Housing
Act, both before and after Bermar, remains associated with
racially infused urban clearance.6 8
These race-based patterns of urban clearance were evident
in Berman, which authorized a use of eminent domain that
resulted in the demolition of a 97.5% black community.69 Em-
powered by decades of city beautification efforts, and seeking
to restore the "charm" to the neighborhood in question, the
Court affirmed the government's significant discretion to con-
demn neighborhoods as "blighted" and to tear them down for
the purpose of redevelopment. 7 0 By enshrining the Housing
Act's condemnation of "blight" as a valid public use of the emi-
nent domain power, Berman accelerated urban redevelop-
ment's already strong record of race-based exclusion. The City
Beautiful movement had finally come to fruition, but the fruit
was rancid.
Post-Berman, "blight" became a potent linguistic tool. By
merely labeling an urban neighborhood as "blighted," legisla-
tures could quickly target minority neighborhoods for clear-
ance and redevelopment, regardless of the community's actual
conditions:
Blight, renewal proponents argued, was a disease that
threatened to turn healthy areas into slums. A vague, amor-
64 See Meals, supra note 60, at 119.
65 Tattenbaum, supra note 62, at 226.
66 Id.
67 See icL (noting that the semantic change to urban renewal "did not present
a significant practical departure from urban redevelopment").
68 See id.
69 See Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1047, 1085
(1996).
70 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-35 (1954) ("Congress and its au-
thorized agencies have made [blight] determinations that take into account a wide
variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them.... Once the object is within
the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent
domain is clear.").
[Vol. 104:10471056
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phous term, blight was a rhetorical device that enabled re-
newal advocates to reorganize property ownership by
declaring certain real estate dangerous to the future of the
city.7 '
Coupled with Bennar's permissive stance toward public
use, blight enabled local governments to "[use] their powers of
eminent domain to condemn and demolish entire communities
located in America's inner cities." 72 Government actors in-
creasingly weaponized blight condemnations to displace un-
wanted minority groups from certain neighborhoods:
Blight was a facially neutral term infused with racial and
ethnic prejudice. While it purportedly assessed the state of
urban infrastructure, blight was often used to describe the
negative impact of certain residents on city neighborhoods.
This "scientific" method of understanding urban decline was
used to justify the removal of blacks and other minorities
from certain parts of the city.7 3
Of course, at least some efforts to abate urban decay were
motivated by genuine concern for the health of city residents.74
But "there is also no doubt that many of the neighborhoods
that stood in the way of urban renewal were not slums, and
that the money spent for new housing largely went for build-
ings too expensive for those displaced to afford." 75 And of the
1,000,000 individuals estimated to be displaced by urban re-
newal, more than half of them were black.7 6 Deliberately or
not, eminent domain undertaken in the name of blight clear-
ance and urban renewal disproportionately targeted black and
African American communities.7 7
Accordingly, the postwar urban revitalization period has
been described as a time of minority "clearance and contain-
71 See Pritchett, supra note 56, at 3.
72 Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary
Examination of Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REv. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 177
(2016) [hereinafter Atuahene, Sociolegal Conceptl.
73 Pritchett, supra note 56, at 6.
74 See Frug, supra note 69, at 1085-86.
75 icL
76 See id.
77 See Atuahene, Sociolegal Concept, supra note 72, at 177; see also Paul
Boudreaux, Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the Solution of Representation
Reinforcement, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (2005) ("So scornful are many commen-
tators today of the once-lauded urban renewal projects of the mid and late twenti-
eth century that they are often referred to derisively as 'Negro removal.'" (first
quoting David H. Harris, Jr., The Battle for Black Land: Fighting Eminent Domain,
NBA NAT'L BAR ASS'N MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 12; then quoting Pritchett, supra
note 56, at 47)).
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ment." 78 Displaced from their homes by eminent domain, but
often priced out of their neighborhoods by gentrification and
rising prices, minority families were increasingly relocated to
public housing.7 9 Combined with government subsidies to en-
courage suburban home ownership, which largely benefited
the white middle class, these practices entrenched de facto
segregation.8 0 Urban minority communities relocated to differ-
ent urban minority communities, needlessly inflicting upon
thousands of families the indignity of having their homes,
neighborhoods, and communities seized and destroyed.8 1
By 1974, a host of socioeconomic factors brought the for-
mal Urban Renewal era to an end.8 2 But although federal pro-
grams called "redevelopment" or "urban renewal" disappeared,
Berman's invidious weaponization of "public use" has
lingered.8 3 New legislation has repeatedly reauthorized blight
eradication, slum clearance, and redevelopment, perpetuating
the legacy of urban renewal to the present day.
With this history of racial targeting in mind, it should come
as no surprise that Kelo's expansion of public use beyond its
already vast scope sent shockwaves across the country.8
Even after the Kelo backlash, however, subsequent decisions
have done little to quell concerns about abuses of eminent
domain.8 5 Consider 2015's Texas Department of Housing and
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. 86
There, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of legal chal-
lenges to urban redevelopment based on a disparate impact on
minorities, noting that "[local policy discretion that operates to
maintain housing barriers and perpetuate the status quo of
78 Stacy Seicshnaydre, Disparate Impact and the Limits of Local Discretion
After Inclusive Communities, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 663, 698 (2017).
79 See id.
80 See id.
81 See Frug, supra note 69, at 1069 ("As a result [of public housing projects),
the blacks evicted by urban renewal moved either to existing housing in the black
ghetto or to newly constructed public housing in the same neighborhood; many
whites moved to the suburbs.").
82 Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefned: Revitalizing the Central
City with Resident Control, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 689, 703 (1994) ("[W]ith
Richard Nixon's 'new federalism' in 1974, formal federally sponsored redevelop-
ment ended.").
83 See id.
84 See Somin, supra note 31.
8 Cf. Rigel C. Oliveri, Disparate Impact and Integration: With TDCHA v. Inclu-
sive Communities the Supreme Court Retains an Uneasy Status Quo, 24 J. AFFORD-
ABLE HOUSING & COMMUNnY DEV. L. 267, 286 (2015) ("Ultimately, [subsequent
cases like] Inclusive Communities left existing precedent intact, preserving a legal
theory that was in many ways more important in theory than in practice.").
86 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
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racial isolation, even under the auspices of 'community revitali-
zation,' is not legitimate and is subject to challenge." 7 Fur-
ther, the Court affirmed the importance of "prevent[ing]
segregated housing patterns that might otherwise result from
covert and illicit stereotyping."8 8
Despite these affirmations, Inclusive Communities remains
a hollow victory for fair housing and community activists. Al-
though it endorsed progressive litigation strategies, the deci-
sion relied on, and underscored, the continued validity of blight
clearance and damaging urban redevelopment initiatives. In-
clusive Communities highlights that even after the backlash to
Kelo's radical expansion of public use, the status quo of urban
destruction has hardly changed. And post-Kelo legislation has
often protected only unblighted properties from condemnation,
implicitly reaffirming Berman's pernicious use of blight.8 9 To-
day, blight condemnations remain the norm, used to justify the
razing and redevelopment of vulnerable communities.
All told, the post-Kelo saga demonstrates the importance of
meaningful checks on eminent domain. Chief among these is
the Takings Clause's just compensation requirement, intended
to safeguard individual rights from overreach by siphoning gov-
ernment funds for each taking of property.9 0 But as with all
checks and balances, the Takings Clause is most effective
when its powers and obligations are held in a delicate balance:
Overemphasizing the republicanism in the [public use re-
quirement] allows a government to gobble up property for
public uses pursuant to its eminent domain power, which
transgresses the time-honored respect for private property.
On the other hand, overemphasizing the liberalism in the
Uust compensation requirement] risks putting the brakes on
government projects that benefit the public, such as public
schools, roads, or firehouses. 9 1
The Supreme Court's increasingly permissive definitions of
public use have disrupted this balance.92 While the meaning of
public use continues to evolve, the Court has refused to do the
same for just compensation.
87 See Seicshnaydre, supra note 78, at 665.
88 See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2522.
89 See David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1871
(2013).
90 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
91 Lopez, supra note 3, at 253.
92 See id. at 290.
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The notion of compensation for eminent domain reaches
back hundreds of years to English common law.9 3 Based on
this history, the Fifth Amendment later enshrined the compen-
sation requirement, with the key addition of one word: "just."9 4
But American courts had little opportunity to explore the
meaning of "just compensation" until the late nineteenth cen-
tury.95 The Supreme Court finally addressed "just compensa-
tion" in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States.96
Monongahela concerned government use of eminent do-
main to seize a dam on the Monongahela River. In its opinion,
the Court directly addressed the addition of the word "just" to
the Takings Clause's compensation requirement.9 7 Noting the
use of "just" as a form of emphasis, the Court explained that
"just compensation" must therefore demand "a full and perfect
equivalent for the property taken."98 In the Court's view, the
Constitution's promise of "a full and perfect equivalent" applied
only "for the property, and not to the owner."9 9
With this pronouncement, Monongahela established that
the Takings Clause requires compensation only for seized prop-
erty-regardless of any nonproperty value or incidental bene-
fits an owner may lose as a consequence of her property being
seized. 100 But the Court's rationale remains opaque. The deci-
sion offered a seeming contradiction between "a full and perfect
equivalent" and compensation solely "for the property." Fur-
ther, Monongahela remains in tension with earlier statements
that just compensation requires the "full indemnification and
equivalent of the injury thereby sustained"' 0 ' and "with the
later statement in Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Bos-
ton that the Constitution 'deals with persons, not with tracts of
93 See Ely, Jr., supra note 13, at 9 (quoting the Magna Carta's requirement of
compensation for government takings).
94 U.S. CONsT. amend. V, cl. 4.
95 Ely, Jr., supra note 13, at 11 (noting that "[tihe Supreme Court ruled in
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)[,] that the Bill of Rights, including the
Fifth Amendment, applied only to the federal government. [But] [tihe national
government rarely utilized eminent domain until the late nineteenth century.").
96 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
97 See id. at 325-26.
98 Id. at 326.
99 Id.
100 See id.; see also Ely, Jr., supra note 13, at 12 ("[The added qualification
that compensation was for the property taken and not for losses to the owner has
come to be understood as barring compensation for collateral or consequential
losses that the government may impose on private owners.").
101 See Ely, Jr., supra note 13, at 10.
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land.'"10 2 Subsequent case law has not resolved these
inconsistencies.
The Supreme Court compounded this conclusory and rigid
understanding in Olson v. United States, which attempted to
further clarify the meaning of just compensation.1 0 3 Writing of
the "full and perfect equivalent" mentioned in Monongahela,
the Court stated that just compensation is the "equivalent [of]
the market value of the property at the time of the taking[,]
contemporaneously paid in money."l0 4 The Court continued,
"[just compensation includes all elements of value that inhere
in the property, but it does not exceed market value fairly deter-
mined."'0 5 Although these statements recognized that a plain-
tiff should "be made whole," the Olson Court ignored the
tension surrounding Monongahela and inexplicably closed the
door to alternative interpretations of "a full and perfect
equivalent." 06 In so doing, Olson enshrined "fair market
value" as the modern just compensation standard. 0 7
Since Olson, the meaning of the just compensation require-
ment has largely remained static, whereas the public use re-
quirement has expanded dramatically during the same time
frame. These dual requirements were intended to check each
other, but the difference in scope that has developed between
the two suggests that the Takings Clause's intended balance
has not been achieved. Urban renewal and its destructive leg-
acy continue to highlight this constitutional imbalance and the
corresponding need to redefine just compensation.
B. Criticisms of the Fair Market Value Standard
With the public use requirement having received its fair
share of judicial attention, the Court's restrictive approach to
just compensation has prompted scholars to question the con-
tinued validity of the fair market value standard. After all,
"[r]emoving weight from one side of a balance is only one way to
102 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)).
103 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
104 Id. at 254-55.
105 Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
106 See id.
107 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 625 (2001) (first citing Olson,
292 U.S. at 255; then citing 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.01 (Julius L.
Sackman ed., 3d rev. ed. 2000)). But see Sperow, supra note 11, at 408 (2007) ("In
certain circumstances, however, condemnees may also be entitled to reasonable
moving expenses and other bonus payments above the fair market value of their
property."). Given criticisms of just compensation doctrine's focus on financial
compensation, payment of additional expenses does not change the analysis set
forth in this Note. See infra subpart I.B.
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correct an imbalance. If the Takings Clause balance is to move
toward equipoise, one way to do so without disruption to public
use doctrine is to alter the interpretation of the just compensa-
tion clause."10 8
Some scholars have critiqued fair market value from an
economic perspective. According to these critics, fair market
value as contemplated in Olson is an unfair and inaccurate cap
on Monongahelds ideal of a "full and perfect equivalent for the
property taken."10 9 For example, Professor James W. Ely, Jr.
has noted that: "The [fair market value] standard takes no ac-
count of consequential damages, such as broken community
ties[,] lost profits, relocation expenses, loss of business good-
will, and costs of litigation."'o In short, the Court's emphasis
on a singular measure of compensation overlooks the complex
ways in which people function as economic actors.111 By elimi-
nating many possible avenues for recourse, the fair market
value standard increases the risk that land transfers pursuant
to eminent domain will result in gross economic disparities.1 1 2
Indeed, even Monongalhela considered the impact of nonmarket
value compensation, when the Court noted the government's
right to continue collecting toll profits from the seized dam.113
Scholars have also criticized fair market value for en-
trenching Monongahela's central flaw: its refusal to contem-
plate injuries to the owner of the seized property.114 As
Professor Richard Epstein has explained, "The central difficulty
of the market value formula for explicit compensation . . . is
that it denies any compensation for real but subjective val-
108 Lopez, supra note 3, at 290.
109 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
110 Ely, Jr., supra note 13, at 14 (citing Gideon Kanner, When Is "Property" Not
"Property Itself": A Critical Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for
Loss of Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 CAL. W. L. REv. 57 (1969)).
111 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 57 (6th ed. 2003) (ex-
plaining that "just compensation is not full compensation in the economic sense"
because it excludes the possibility of compensation for the loss of "subjective
values").
112 See Benjamin A. Householder, Note, Kelo Compensation: The Future of
Economic Development Takings, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1029, 1033 (2007).
113 Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 337 ("[A]fter taking this property, the govern-
ment will have the right to exact the same tolls the navigation company has been
receiving.").
114 Ely, Jr., supra note 13, at 14-15 ("[Tihe fair market value approach ignores
the subjective value that an owner has in his or her property. These might include
not only sentimental attachments but also the special suitability of the property
for their personal needs. Critics charge that the fair market value standard in
effect confiscates such subjective value. Indeed, some scholars maintain that the
prevailing fair market test systematically under compensates persons whose
property is taken for public use.").
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ues."" 5 Among these overlooked values, for instance, are the
"sentimental or other non-economic value[s] condemnees may
place on their homes."' 16 In particular, eminent domain exacts
a unique toll on displaced homeowners, as government takings
forcibly divorce the homeowner from "the connection to her
home formed from life's experiences occurring within its con-
fines."1 17 And as an amicus brief in favor of New London ad-
mitted during the Kelo litigation, the most obvious shortfall of
the fair market value standard is that it does not appreciate the
noneconomic value that owners attach to their properties." 8
These comments suggest that even if fair market value
were replaced with more accurate measures of monetary com-
pensation, monetary payments may be inadequate to compen-
sate for some losses.' '1 Therefore, especially in light of the
expansive public use doctrine, courts should begin to recon-
sider the meaning of just compensation. As Professor Alberto
B. Lopez notes:
The use of the word "just," . . . connotes that the compensa-
tion should fairly remunerate the individual for the loss suf-
fered at the hands of the government. The damage caused to
the person as a result of eminent domain unquestionably
includes not only the loss of soil, but also subjective
harm.. .. [Today,] [t]he compensation provided to the dis-
possessed owner is not just in the sense that it is fair or
deserved but instead becomes superfluous in that it is just-
in the sense that it is only-compensation.1 2 0
C. Dignity in American Jurisprudence
Fortunately for critics of the fair market value standard,
noneconomic injuries are judicially cognizable, and thus,
redressable.121 American courts have long contemplated dig-
nity as a nonenumerated value implicit in the Constitution.1 2 2
115 Lopez, supra note 3, at 292-93 (quoting EPSTEIN, supra note 13 at 83).
116 Sperow, supra note 11, at 408.
117 Lopez, supra note 3, at 292.
I1s See Householder, supra note 112, at 1055-56.
119 See Lopez, supra note 3, at 291-92 ("Gain-based compensation and legisla-
tive benchmarks for payments are nothing more than assembly-line compensa-
tion divorced from the individual assessment required of the liberalism embraced
by the just compensation clause."); Sperow, supra note 11, at 408.
120 Lopez, supra note 3, at 294.
121 See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20-25 (1998) (finding that the respon-
dents' "inability to obtain information" was a redressable injury in fact).
122 Christopher A. Bracey, Getting Back to Basics: Some Thoughts on Dignity,
Materialism, and a Culture of Racial Equality, 26 CHICANA/O-LATINA/O L. REv. 15,
17 (2006) ("In the American context, the idea of dignity survives largely through
interpretive efforts of judges who identify dignity as an inherent constitutional
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In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court indicated that
"[flrom its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to
foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its bor-
ders."l 2 3 More recently, the Court has repeatedly signaled that
arguments centered on protections for individual dignity fit
within the existing constitutional framework.1 2 4 Although sev-
eral dignity-based arguments have been tied to landmark
LGBT rights cases,125 the Court has noted the importance of
dignity in other areas, such as in countering racial discrimina-
tion.1 26 Justice Sotomayor recently explained why dignitary
harms matter in the racial discrimination context, writing,
"Race matters because of . .. the silent judgments that rein-
force that most crippling of thoughts: 'I do not belong here.'" 127
In the equal protection context and elsewhere, dignity is inter-
twined with key constitutional values.
The Takings Clause itself leaves ample room to embrace
dignity. Consider the writings of James Madison, who drafted
value. Indeed, modern American courts have come to rely upon dignitary dis-
course when analyzing Fourth Amendment protections against unlawful searches
and seizures, Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punish-
ments, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment antidiscrimination claims, and
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment issues involving women's reproductive
rights.").
123 Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianisrm- Toward a Commu-
nity-Based Welfare System, 66 U. Prr. L. REv. 721, 766 (2005) (emphasis added)
(quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970)).
124 Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169,
178 (2011) ("In the last 220 years, Supreme Court Justices have invoked [dignity]
in more than nine hundred opinions.").
125 Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) ("The fundamental
liberties protected by [the Due Process] Clause . . . extend to certain personal
choices central to individual dignity . . . ."); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S.
774, 775 (2013) (striking down the federal Defense of Marriage Act as "invalid, for
no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure
those whom the State, . . . sought to protect in personhood and dignity"); Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (striking down a statute criminalizing
homosexual sodomy, given the importance of "intimate conduct" in retaining "dig-
nity as free persons"); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992) ("[C]hoices central to personal dignity ... are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
126 See Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017) (recognizing
the government's "commitment to the equal dignity of all persons," in ruling that
the Sixth Amendment requires the jury "no-impeachment" rule to yield when a
juror's statements clearly indicate she relied on racial animus or stereotypes in
convicting a criminal defendant); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 250, 275 (1964) (affirming Congress's power to prohibit racial discrimi-
nation in interstate commerce, given the relevant Civil Rights Act's purpose to
"vindicate 'the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of
equal access to public establishments'").
127 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 315
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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the Clause. "In [his essay Property], Madison conceived of
property as more than a mere physical object, describing it as
including several intangibles such as opinions, safety, and free
choice."1 2 8 Justice Rehnquist later drew on these intangibles
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, writing,
"[P]roperty as used in the Taking Clause . . . 'is addressed to
every sort of interest the citizen may possess."'1 29 Arguably
among these are the unique dignitary interests that people re-
tain in their homes.
The Supreme Court has long understood the unique status
of individual rights in the context of the home.13 0 For instance,
people retain special interests in speech connected with the
home, such as placing a sign in one's front yard.1 3 1 Further,
The home is a moral nexus between liberty, privacy, and
freedom of association. A clear example of the nexus is Stan-
ley v. Georgia, . . . [where] the Supreme Court held that a
state may not prosecute a person for possessing obscene
materials in her home. Although the Court rested its holding
on the "philosophy of the [F]irst [Almendment," it is apparent
that the Court was influenced by an appreciation of our soci-
ety's traditional connection between one's home and one's
sense of autonomy and personhood.1 3 2
The Court later echoed this connection between identity, dig-
nity, and the home in Lawrence v. Texas. 1 The case struck
down a statute banning homosexual sodomy, in part because
of the right of consenting adults to exercise autonomy within
the home. '3 As Justice Kennedy explained for the majority,
the Constitution protects consensual intimate relationships
128 Emily A. Johnson, Note, Reconciling Originalism and the History of the
Public Use Clause, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 265, 298-99 (2010) (citing James Madison,
Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 266, 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983)).
129 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 142-43 (1978)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. General
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945)).
130 See Nadler & Diamond, supra note 34, at 722 ("As others have previously
observed-including Justice Thomas in his Kelo dissent-the law recognizes the
special, if not sacred, character of the home in areas as disparate as government
searches, free speech, and tax policy.").
131 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994) ("A special respect for
individual liberty in the home has long been part of our culture and our law.").
132 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957,
991-92 (1982) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565
(1969)).
33 See 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) ("[Clhoices central to personal dignity ... are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992))).
134 See id. at 567, 578.
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between adults, "in the confines of their homes ... [to] retain
their dignity as free persons." 3 5
Following the lead of Penn Central and Lawrence, Takings
Clause litigation often seems to contemplate the intense per-
sonal connection between real property, autonomy, and iden-
tity. As Joshua Brian Lanphear has noted about Kelo, "[Ain
emotional and psychological link existed between Susette
Kelo's and [co-plaintiff] Wilhelmina Dery's self-identities and
their real property. The fact that . . . [they] brought suit to
challenge this determination only bolsters this emotional and
psychological link."13 6
The Court has historically recognized that the Takings
Clause protects a variety of intangible interests, notwithstand-
ing its reticence towards compensating those interests.13 7 For
example, the Takings Clause protects the valuable right to con-
trol property. ' 3 8 Additionally, the Clause protects the right to
devise property upon death.1'e The Takings Clause further
protects the right to exclude, ' 4 0 and the Court has heard Tak-
ings Clause cases on the property rights in trade secrets or
interest in an escrow fund. 14 1
All told, these decisions regard property rights as "evolu-
tionary," growing and adapting as people reconceive their rela-
tionships to property in particular historical contexts. 1 4 2
135 Id. at 567.
136 Lanphear, supra note 58, at 34.
137 Notably,
ITihe absence of language addressing subjective harm in [Takings
Clausel cases stems from one fact: the law did not recognize mental
or emotional distress as a compensable injury without accompany-
ing physical harm until the twentieth century.... From a historical
perspective, then, the failure to account for subjective mental harm
for purposes ofjust compensation is not the result of careful consid-
eration or experience. Rather, the absence of subjective harm from
just compensation jurisprudence is the product of historical inertia.
Lopez, supra note 3, at 298-99 (footnotes omitted).
138 See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998) (noting that
even where interest income on lawyers' pooled trust accounts "may have no eco-
nomically realizable value to its owner, possession, control, and disposition are
nonetheless valuable rights that inhere in the property" (emphasis added)); JAN G.
IAITOS, LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION: LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL POWERS
§ 7.02[B] (1999 & Supp. 2001-2) (citing Phillips and indicating that "the right to
control" Is "critical" to the Takings Clause's protection of "intangible right[s]").
139 See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987).
140 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433
(1982).
141 Carol M. Rose, Racially Restrictive Covenants-Were They Dignity Tak-
ings?, 41 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 939, 948 (2016); see also E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S.
498 (1988); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
142 See Pritchett, supra note 56, at 6 ("Several influential scholars, particularly
Joseph Sax, Carol Rose, and Laura Underkuffler, have argued that property rights
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Indeed, "American courts and legislatures have adjusted prop-
erty rights for decades without any serious argument that
those changes violated the [Takings] Clause."l 4 3 Given the
longstanding recognition of intangible interests in the Takings
Clause context, attempts to redress eminent domain's digni-
tary harms may ultimately survive constitutional scrutiny.14 4
II
ANALYSIS
A. Understanding Urban Renewal Through the Dignity
Takings Framework
Bernadette Atuahene's concept of "dignity takings" pro-
vides a useful framework for thinking about the relationship
between eminent domain, just compensation, and dignity. Ac-
cording to Atuahene, a dignity taking occurs "when a state
directly or indirectly destroys or confiscates property rights
from owners or occupiers and the intentional or unintentional
outcome is dehumanization or infantilization."1 4 5  Although
should be viewed as 'evolutionary' doctrines... . Understanding the evolution of
property rights requires an examination of the ways that people conceive of their
relationship to property in particular historical contexts.").
143 John G. Sprankling, Property Law for the Anthropocene Era, 59 ARIZ. L.
REv. 737, 755 (2017). In other areas of the law, courts have embraced compensa-
tion for subjective harms such as the intentional infliction of emotional distress or
noneconomic harm caused by medical malpractice. In practice, "[n]either of these
areas of the law involves more speculation than that associated with compensat-
ing for the subjective harm caused by the loss of a home following eminent do-
main." Lopez, supra note 3, at 298-99.
144 Cf Sprankling, supra note 143, at 755 ("[Nlew techniques for modifying
property rights that are rooted in existing legal doctrines . .. are more likely to
survive constitutional scrutiny than those that are not.").
145 Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a
New Theoretical Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the
Remedies Required, 41 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 796, 817 (2016) [hereinafter Atuahene,
Dignity Takings]. Atuahene initially expounded the concept of dignity takings in
WE WANT WHAT'S OURS, infra note 146, but has since revised her definition of the
phrase. This Note abides by her revised definition. For more information, see
Atuahene, Dignity Takings, supra note 145, at 800-01. Given that the Supreme
Court has used the term "dignity" in ways that are consonant with Atuahene's
suggestion that human dignity can be diminished or taken, see, for example,
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) ("preserve human dignity"), Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) ("retain their dignity as free persons"), and
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) ("destructive of human dignity"),
this Note takes no position, in light of subsequent scholarship, as to whether the
term "dignity taking" most accurately describes the "dehumanization or infan-
tilization" with which Atuahene is concerned. See Gregory S. Alexander, Property,
Dignity, and Human Flourishing, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 991, 1000 (2019) (arguing
that "[dlignity is indefeasible"). Regardless of terminology, this Note agrees with
Professor Alexander's assertion that "every person must be equally entitled to
those things essential for human flourishing, i.e., the capabilities that are the
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her scholarship has predominantly focused on South Africa,
Atuahene has identified dignity takings as relevant in a variety
of other contexts.1 4 6 Most notably, Atuahene has drawn pre-
liminary connections between dignity takings and urban
renewal.1 4 7
Atuahene couples her idea of dignity takings with the pro-
cess of "dignity restoration," defined as "a remedy that seeks to
provide dispossessed individuals and communities with mate-
rial compensation through processes that affirm their human-
ity and reinforce their agency."1 4 8 If we understand blight
condemnation and urban renewal as forms of eminent domain
that constitute a dignity taking, then the process of dignity
restoration offers a new perspective on reforming the meaning
of just compensation.
To constitute a dignity taking, a state must directly or indi-
rectly destroy or confiscate property rights from owners or oc-
cupiers.1 4 9  In the case of urban blight clearance, the
government's use of eminent domain clearly meets this crite-
rion.1 5 0 By definition, eminent domain requires the govern-
ment to confiscate individual property rights, taking ownership
itself. 151
Next, dignity takings require that the intentional or unin-
tentional outcome of the property confiscation be dehumaniza-
foundation of flourishing and the material resources required to nurture those
capabilities. In the absence of these capabilities and supporting resources, recog-
nition of the entitlement to flourish is simply an empty gesture." Id. at 997; see
infra subpart II.B.
146 See BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT'S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH
AFRICA'S LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM 176 (2014). Scholars have taken up the call,
discussing dignity takings in contexts ranging from the displacement of the Hopi
from their sacred lands to the terrorizing of African Americans after the 1921
Tulsa Race Riot. See, e.g., Atuahene, Dignity Takings, supra note 145, at 797;
Alfred L. Brophy, When More Than Property is Lost: The Dignitary Losses and
Gains in the Tulsa Riot of 1921, 41 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 824 (2016); Justin B.
Richland, Dignity as (Self-)Determination: Hopi Sovereignty in the Face of U.S.
Dispossessions, 41 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 917 (2016).
147 See Atuahene, Sociolegal Concept, supra note 72, at 177-78.
148 Atuahene, Dignity Takings, supra note 145, at 818. As with her definition
of dignity takings, Atuahene initially expounded the concept of dignity restoration
in WE WANT WHAT'S OURS, supra note 146, but has since revised her definition of
the phrase. This Note abides by her revised definition. For more information, see
Atuahene, Dignity Takings, supra note 145, at 802.
149 Atuahene, Dignity Takings, supra note 145, at 817.
150 To be clear, Atuahene's definition seems to contemplate incidental harms
to dignity inflicted by the confiscation of other forms of property. In this example,
the government seizes real property, with harms to dignity occurring as the "in-
tentional or unintentional outcome." See id.
151 See Galgano, supra note 17, at 220.
RETHINKING "JUST" COMPENSATION
tion or infantilization.15 2 The systematic targeting and
displacement of urban minority communities readily quali-
fies. 153 Christopher Bracey has pointed out the damage
caused by systematic racial discrimination to individual feel-
ings of self-worth. He explains that "racial repression can be
understood as a thoroughgoing attempt to deny basic dignity
and equal humanity of others because of their race."1 54
Framed another way, denials of individual dignity run counter
to core values of freedom and equality. 15 5 By targeting minor-
ity communities for eminent domain, treating them as less-
than-equal, the government denies the humanity of those
individuals.
Part of the reason that large-scale eminent domain invali-
dates individual feelings of dignity stems from the important
role that land plays in self-identity. 15 6 Space and place contex-
tualize community interactions, and so the systematic demoli-
tion of urban residential neighborhoods can be understood as a
severe psychological trauma and intangible harm.15 7 To para-
phrase the work of psychiatrist Mindy Fullilove,
[All people dislocated through condemnation may suffer
from "root shock," which is "the traumatic stress reaction to
the destruction of all or part of one's emotional ecosys-
tem ..... Such a blow threatens the whole body's ability to
function . . . . Shock is the fight for survival after a life-
threatening blow to the body's internal balance." [This] con-
dition [is] potentially permanent and personally
catastrophic. 5 8
People relate to community in deep and extremely personal
ways.15 9 "The aesthetics and atmosphere of our neighbor-
152 Atuahene, Dignity Takings, supra note 145, at 817.
153 See Atuahene, Sociolegal Concept, supra note 72, at 177-78.
154 Bracey, supra note 122, at 17.
155 Id. at 18.
156 Eduardo Moises Pefialver, Is Land Special?: The Unjustified Preference for
Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227, 268 (2004).
157 See Atuahene, Sociolegal Concept, supra note 72, at 177-78.
158 Yxta Maya Murray, Peering, 22 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 249, 296-97
(2015) [hereinafter Murray, Peering] (quoting MINDY FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: How
TEARING UP CITY NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABoUT IT 11
(2009)).
159 See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography
in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1841, 1913 n.236 (1994) ("Anyone who
doubts the importance of a geographical cultural base need only look to the
immigrant and racially identified communities who reconstruct a racio-national
space within their (new) home country and who look toward their ancestral home-
land long after any tangible connections have disintegrated. Consider the emo-
tional bond of Miami Cubans to a Cuba that is unlikely to accept them within this
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hoods and communities ... affect the ways we think and inter-
act with each other, how our children play, how we choose to
travel, and even crime rates."16 0 By condemning and displac-
ing these communities, urban renewal's eminent domain prac-
tices have expressed a blatant disregard for the unique and
sensitive nature of each person's humanity.
Consider New Orleans' Trem6 neighborhood, a historically
black and African American community. 16 1 During the heyday
of urban renewal, "much of the neighborhood was destroyed
with Federal Urban Renewal funds .... The destruction lev-
eled eight blocks of historic Creole cottages and music halls, as
well as other community structures, and tore out the streets
where the music flowed."' 62 Nevertheless, city government ig-
nored the destructive impact of urban redevelopment on the
community, and in the 1980s sought again to raze parts of the
Trem6, this time to build a Tivoli Gardens amusement park. 163
Although Tivoli Gardens never materialized, urban "revital-
ization" ultimately won out, demolishing half the neighborhood
and evicting its residents from their homes.1 6 4 Today, the site
hosts Louis Armstrong Park, which separates the Treme from
the adjacent tourist hub of the French Quarter. 165 The con-
struction of the Park pushed a vibrant center of black life in
New Orleans even further out of the public eye, reinforcing
systems of oppression that ensure "the everyday places,
homes, and histories of poor and working people are less likely
to make headlines when they are under threat." 166
century and that is undoubtedly far less familiar to many of them than is South-
ern Florida.").
160 Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697,
699 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
161 See J. Mark Souther, The Disneyfication of New Orleans: The French Quar-
ter as Facade in a Divided City, 94 J. AM. HIST. 804 (2007).
162 Frances Frank Marcus, New Orleans Disputes Future of Park on Site of
Treme, Where Jazz Dug In, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 1983), http://www.nytimes.com/
1983/03/23/us/new-orleans-disputes-future-of-park-on-site-of-treme-where-
jazz-dug-in.html [https://perma.cc/W3PJ-L6P31.
163 See MICHAEL E. CRUTCHER, JR., TREME: RACE AND PLACE IN A NEW ORLEANS
NEIGHBORHOOD 75-81 (2010).
164 See Dan Baum, The Lost Year: Behind the Failure to Rebuild, NEW YORKER
(Aug. 21, 2006), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/08/21/the-lost-
year/ [https://perma.ce/K2UE-TV8R].
165 See Souther, supra note 161.
166 MANDI ISAACS JACKSON, MODEL CITY BLuES: URBAN SPACE AND ORGANIZED RESIS-
TANCE IN NEW HAVEN 5 (2008). As for the acclaimed HBO series Treme, any inciden-
tal benefits of the series to the community likely do little to compensate for past
harms, especially when viewed in light of the financial benefits that HBO reaps.
Cf. Householder, supra note 112, at 1045-46 ("[Wlhere a private corporation will
profit from a condemnation-justified by collateral benefits to the local economy-
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Alternatively, consider New Haven, Connecticut, which at
the height of urban renewal received more per capita federal
funding for demolition and construction projects than any
other city in the United States.1 6 7 In 1957, riding on the coat-
tails of Berman, the city extended the Route 34 highway
through the "blighted" Oak Street neighborhood, formerly a
thriving community of lower-income African American, Italian,
and Jewish residents. 168 Although many of the neighborhood's
white residents were able to relocate to nearby suburbs, Oak
Street's African American residents "found themselves-at
rates far higher than whites-in public housing, such as the
large and increasingly 'troublesome' Elm Haven project in the
Dixwell neighborhood."1 69 Unfortunately, the Dixwell project
itself was later redeveloped, in a manner "more disruptive than
the much-publicized and celebrated Oak Street project. More
than 1,100 households and close to 200 businesses were forci-
bly relocated, and nearly 30 percent of the housing units in the
area were completely demolished."o7 0 And for those who had
the initial fortune of relocating to the Hill neighborhood rather
than Dixwell, luck soon ran out when the Hill, too, was demol-
ished-forcing Oak Street's inhabitants to experience urban
renewal "for the second, third, or even fourth time."171
Today, "[tihe neighborhood once called Oak Street is now a
collection of extinct street names. In its place are a broad and
somewhat useless highway connector and a few very large,
architecturally prominent, and visually underwhelming park-
ing garages."1 72 In New Haven as in New Orleans, urban re-
newal deliberately dispossessed and displaced lower-income,
minority urban residents from America's downtowns.
Far from being a historical relic, policies perpetuating the
legacy of urban renewal are still being implemented. 17 For
the condemnee is suffering an 'unfair and disproportionate burden.'" (quoting
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 129 (1950)).
167 Exhibition Celebrates New Haven Before and After It Became a Model City,
YALENEwS (June 3, 2004), https://news.yale.edu/2004/06/03/exhibition-cele
brates-new-haven-and-after-it-became-model-city [https://perma.cc/PE7P-
44JU.
168 Rob Gurwitt, Death of a Neighborhood, MOTHER JONES (Sept./Oct. 2000),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2000/09/death-neighborhood/ [https://
perma.cc/A2NS-QUQQ].
169 JACKSON, supra note 166, at 19.
170 Id.
171 See id. at 22.
172 Id. at 18.
173 See Meron Werkneh, Retaking Mecca: Healing Harlem Through Restorative
Just Compensaton, 51 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 225, 226 (2017) ("in the name of
'economic revitalization,' cities exercise their eminent domain authority on a large
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instance, Berman remains important in cities like Detroit,
which has formed a Blight Removal Task Force with the goal of
removing all "blighted" properties from the city.1 74 Although
such efforts may seem like a laudable attempt to revitalize
decaying urban areas, the Task Force's plans are functionally
indistinguishable from the destructive practices of urban re-
newal, taking little account of the community's actual vitality,
concerns, or needs.17 5 Moreover, Detroit's residents continue
to live with the scars of failed projects from the heyday of urban
renewal.1 7 6 The forced displacement and entrenched segrega-
tion these residents have experienced contributed to a steep
decline in quality of life: "Things are so bad in Detroit that
social service workers began using a new term to describe the
level of want of its citizens: 'deep poverty.'"' 7 7 Blight condem-
nations symbolically treat these neighborhoods as incapable of
scale . . . often displacing a more vulnerable community in the process. This
process-known as gentrification-is currently occurring in Harlem, where fre-
quent land condemnations are claiming the homes of many residents." (footnote
omitted)); see also Richard C. Schragger, The Political Economy of City Power, 44
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 91, 109 (2017) ("Even now, after the heyday of urban renewal,
city rejuvenation efforts paid for with federal monies often disenfranchise and
uproot the urban poor, while shifting monies to corporate interests.").
174 DETROIT BLIGHT REMOVAL TASK FORCE, http://www.timetoendblight.com/
[https://perma.cc/F6TF-NIAY].
175 See Yxta Maya Murray, Detroit Looks Toward a Massive, Unconstitutional
Blight Condemnation: The Optics of Eminent Domain in Motor City, 23 GEO. J.
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 395, 397 (2016) [hereinafter Murray, Detroai] (stating, when
referring to statements made by one of the Task Force's leaders, "[Bilight clear-
ances historically exploit low-income communities and people of color, yet these
same officials also pretend that this danger does not exist" (footnote omitted)); see
also Seicshnaydre, supra note 78, at 685 n. 168 ("After decades of enduring urban
renewal and revitalization efforts, inner-city residents of color have come to be-
lieve that if the neighborhood they live in is being improved by money from outside
the community, then the intention is to improve it for someone other than them."
(quoting James J. Kelley, Jr., Affirmatively Furthering Neighborhood Choice: Va-
cant Property Strategies and Fair Housing, 46 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 1009, 1035
(2016))).
176 See Murray, Detroit, supra note 175, at 436 ("[Rlacist uses of eminent
domain in the 1940s and 1950s helped created current poverty in a city that is
nearly 82% African American." (footnote omitted)); id. at 436 n.392 ("City offi-
cials . . . destroyed much extant housing to build highways, hospitals, housing
projects, and a civic center complex, further limiting the housing options of
blacks." (quoting THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND
INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT 36 (1996))).
177 Murray, Peering, supra note 158, at 305 (citing Debra Watson, "Deep Pov-
erty" Growing in Detroit, Nationally as Benefits Are Cut, VOICE OF DETROIT (March
31, 2010), http://voiceofdetroit.net/2011/07/15/deep-poverty-growing-in-de
troit-nationally-as-benefits-are-cut/ [https://perma.cc/MZ55-XJU2] ("Even the
term 'poor' is no longer adequate to describe the desperate conditions in Detroit.").
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independent recovery while also doing little to fix the root
causes of urban decline.178
Even where urban redevelopment has unintentionally sin-
gled out minorities, discrimination has remained an undercur-
rent of American eminent domain. For instance, in Town of
Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, the Supreme Court
recognized the town's restriction of multifamily homes to a
predominantly minority neighborhood as having a discrimina-
tory and segregationist impact on the area's minority re-
sidents.1 7 9 These exclusionary practices, and others, further
stigmatized minority communities and inherently raise digni-
tary issues.18 0 "[To take away someone's property against his
or her will, particularly without generally applicable reasons or
compensation, is to signal that this person is not someone
whose wishes and projects really matter. It is to treat the
owner as an 'other' who does not deserve respect." 18
These are but a few of the countless examples of urban
renewal's systematic dehumanization and infantilization of mi-
nority communities. By targeting and displacing minorities,
government exercises of eminent domain have undermined
these individuals' freedom and dignity. 182 The harmful legacies
of Berman, Kelo, and other cases embody a series of value
judgments that use "blight" as a pretext for putting minorities
and the disadvantaged "in their 'proper place.' In the Fifth
Amendment takings context, this means they are at risk for
condemnation." 8 3 Such condemnation acts as a "perilous era-
sure and dehumanization of the very vulnerable." 8 4 And as
the Supreme Court has recognized for decades since Brown v.
Board of Education, "a person who is physically excluded from
a place often feels stigmatized and degraded."18 5
At bottom, there is ample evidence that blight condemna-
tions, slum clearance, and urban renewal policies have evinced
a persistent government disregard for the degradation that
178 See Quinones, supra note 82, at 692.
179 See James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The
Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1049, 1074-75 (1989) (citing
Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15 (1988)).
180 See Rose, supra note 141, at 945.
181 Id.
182 See Sarah Schindler, Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segrega-
tion Through Physical Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J. 1934,
2016-17 (2015).
183 Murray, Peering, supra note 158, at 249.
184 Id. at 293.
185 See Schindler, supra note 182, at 2016-17.
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these policies impose on individuals.' 8 6 Holistic respect for
dignity "requires that one view others as possessing not only
inherent dignity at the personal level-that is, equal human-
ity-but also a presumptive social worth that makes possible
sincere inclusion and acceptance into one's own commu-
nity."1 87 By failing to recognize the humanity inherent in the
displaced and by refusing to consider individual and commu-
nity needs, government eminent domain policies have dehu-
manized and infantilized urban minorities.' 8 8 Blight has
continued to serve as a pretext for displacing entire communi-
ties of color.'8 9 And these problems remain relevant because,
as Timothy Zick writes, "[There is no more fundamental liberty
than the freedom to choose one's own place. The loss of that
freedom can result in severe forms of not only personal, but
constitutional, displacement."' 9 0
B. Government Support for Community-Based Dignity
Restoration
By eroding individual feelings of self-worth and dignity,
urban displacement goes far beyond the confiscation of real
property. Accordingly, remedies intended to restore self-worth
and dignity must go beyond fair market value.191 The govern-
ment must adopt creative solutions to fulfill its obligation to
restore dignity through just compensation.1 92 Certainly, dis-
placed individuals should continue to receive tangible, mone-
tary compensation for the fair market value of their tangible,
186 See Atuahene, Sociolegal Concept, supra note 72, at 177-78.
187 Bracey, supra note 122, at 20.
188 See Atuahene, Dignity Takings, supra note 145, at 801.
189 See Janet Thompson Jackson, What is Property? Property is Theft The
Lack of Social Justice in U.S. Eminent Domain Law, 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 63,
112-13 (2010); see also Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Com-
ments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165, 1255 (1967) ("[Urban redevelopment programs, while plausible enough to
override any 'public purpose' objection, nevertheless depend on a still controver-
sial conception. Easily identified, relatively small numbers of people are being
handed a distinctly disproportionate and frequently excruciating share of the cost
of whatever social gain is involved.").
190 Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 515, 517
(2009) (footnote omitted).
191 See, e.g., Nadler & Diamond, supra note 34, at 715 (conducting two experi-
ments seeking to explain the Kelo backlash and finding that "under some circum-
stances, some people indicated that no amount of money was sufficient to
compensate for the loss of their property").
192 See Atuahene, Dignity Takings, supra note 145, at 801; Lopez, supra note
3, at 294-95.
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seized property. 1 9 3 And, grassroots initiatives may equally em-
power affected residents absent government support. 194 How-
ever, the Takings Clause is not satisfied unless the government
takes affirmative steps to restore the dignity of the communi-
ties that it has historically targeted and displaced.19 5
Government concern for community well-being is not a
new idea, but rather lies at the heart of the Takings Clause. In
drafting the Clause, James Madison drew on the work of legal
scholars who had argued for decades that "the paramount duty
of the state was . .. the regulation and adjustment of economic
power so that the quality of life for all members of society would
be maximized."1 96 Indeed, the Supreme Court has long recog-
nized that individual dignity is inherently tied to the
community:
In the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court often
protects a wide degree of speech; however, the Court has
upheld the constitutionality of defamation and libel suits in
part because they protect the reputational dignity of individ-
uals. Here dignity pertains not to the self-expression of the
speaker, but rather to recognition of the subject's "reputation
and standing in the community."19 7
By improving the overall quality of life in the community, as
Justice Brennan noted in Goldberg, social programs and bene-
fits can help restore dignity. 198 Government support for such
programs can "bring within the reach of the poor the same
opportunities that are available to others to participate mean-
ingfully in the life of the community."19 9
Increased government support for community-based ini-
tiatives such as business development zones, entrepreneurship
193 See Bethany Y. Li, Now is the Timel: Challenging Resegregation and Dis-
placement in the Age of Hypergentrflcation, 85 FORDHAM L. REv. 1189, 1235-41
(2016) (discussing monetary compensation for both renters and owners of seized
property while recognizing that non-monetary compensation may also be
necessary).
194 See Werkneh, supra note 173, at 256-67 (proposing Community Benefits
Agreements between private developers and the community as a form of dignity
restoration).
195 See Atuahene, Dignity Takings, supra note 145, at 801.
196 See Lee Ivy, Note, The 1986 Term "Takings" Clause Cases: A Unified Ap-
proach to Regulatory Takings?, 13 OKIA. CHY U. L. REv. 325, 327 (1988) (referenc-
ing the writings of Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, Burlamaqui, and Vattel, and
noting that Grotius, who is known as the "father of the compensation clause,"
firmly advocated for regulation as a means to improve the quality of life).
197 Neomi Rao, American Dignity and Healthcare Reform, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 171, 177-78 (2012) (footnote omitted) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).
198 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970).
199 Gilman, supra note 123, at 766 (quoting Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265).
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and leadership programs, music and art education, community
gardens, and various other endeavors that foster community
building and a high quality of life is essential to "produce and
sustain meaningful changes in the material lives of racially
subordinated individuals."2 00 Over and above payments for
the fair market value of seized property, government compen-
sation through a clear, long-term commitment to high-quality
urban life can signal that residents hold personal promise and
social value, beginning a dialogue that reestablishes trust, re-
spect, and dignity.20 1 These programs "fill pressing needs in
the community and are critical to the survival of the communi-
ties and to many members of these communities," 2 02 particu-
larly as government budget cuts have caused many such
programs to vanish.2 03
To start, consider the benefits of urban empowerment
zones. These initiatives, already implemented in a number of
disadvantaged communities, 2 04 "[elncourag[e] business crea-
tion and job growth by providing direct financial support, tech-
nical assistance, and other aid" to urban entrepreneurs. 2 0 5 By
working within the existing community-rather than replacing
or destroying it-empowerment zones "foster the creation and
growth of businesses and startup companies [that] create jobs
at disproportionately high rates," and are a key aspect of true
community revitalization. 206 Government support for such ini-
tiatives through increased funding or dialogue with lawmakers
signals that urban entrepreneurs are worthy of investment and
growth. This message opposes condemnations made on the
basis of neighborhood "blight" and begins to repair the digni-
tary harms inflicted by such practices.
200 Bracey, supra note 122, at 18.
201 See Valerie P. Hans, Dignity Takings, Dignity Restoration A Tort Law Per-
spective, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715, 721-22 (2017) ("[Clompensation from a wrong-
doer who directly provides compensation to an injured person should be more
satisfying to the person who has been injured.... [However,] financial compensa-
tion from third parties may also restore equity and the dignity of victims-al-
though the route to dignity restoration may be more indirect." (footnotes omitted)).
202 See LaDona Knigge, Intersections Between Public and Private: Community
Gardens, Community Service and Geographies of Care in the US City of Buffalo,
NY, 64 GEOGRAPHICA HELVETICA 45, 49 (2009).
203 Id. at 49.
204 See Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive
Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399,
428 (2001).
205 See Matthew J. Rossman, Evaluating Trickle Down Charity: A Solution for
Determining When Economic Development Aimed at Revitalizing America's Cities
and Regions Is Really Charitable, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1455, 1455-56 (2014).
206 Id.
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The Community Economic Development (CED) movement
is another successful example of creative investment in the
long-term quality of life in urban communities. Similar to em-
powerment zones, CED has emerged as a grassroots initiative
emphasizing job training programs, small business support,
and building and managing affordable housing.20 7 In contrast
to empowerment zones, however, CED activists relate the
movement's genesis to urban displacement and eminent do-
main. 2 0 8 During the height of urban renewal, "disinvestment
in inner-city neighborhoods contributed to ... increased urban
poverty, inadequate housing, reduction in employment oppor-
tunities and loss of locally owned businesses." 2 0 9 CED efforts
seek to reverse these collateral effects.
The dire need for CED and other forms of economic devel-
opment in urban areas underscores the severity of the harms
that urban renewal policies have created. Government support
for urban job growth and entrepreneurism uplifts depressed
urban economies caused by decades of malicious government
condemnation and begins to treat these communities with
equal dignity. Although financial benefits may result, govern-
ment support for community-based growth is about more than
just money. These initiatives signal that the government cares.
Turning away from the economic realm, consider the value
of community gardens in combatting the public health problem
of food deserts. Neighborhoods located more than a mile from a
supermarket have been deemed "food deserts" for their lack of
accessible, healthy, and affordable food options. 2 10 As of 2012,
approximately 23.5 million Americans, or 8.5% of the national
population, lived in low-income neighborhoods designated as
such. 2 1 1 African Americans are almost four times more likely
to live in food deserts than whites.2 12
Many food deserts are legacies of urban renewal. 2 1 3 Al-
though Americans have become increasingly aware of urban
207 See id.
208 Federal funding tied to urban renewal projects historically focused on en-
couraging the growth of white suburban conrmunities at the expense of urban
minorities. See Roberto Hernandez & Kimberly Rios, Chicago Prize Hoops: Guid-
ing At-Risk Youth to Build Stronger Communities, 7 DEPAUL J. Soc. JUST. 271, 274
(2014).
209 Id. at 273-74.
210 Caitlin Loftus, An Apple a Day-If You Can Find One-Keeps the Doctor
Away: How Food Deserts Hurt America's Health and How Effective Land Use
Regulation Can Eliminate Them, 35 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1, 1 (2012).
211 IJ.
212 Meals, supra note 60, at 105-06.
213 See id. at 116-21.
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agriculture and the need for proper nutrition, the existence of
"food oppression" as a result of structural racism remains rela-
tively obscured. 2 1 4 But the relationship between food deserts
and racial discrimination is unsurprising: "Institutionalized ra-
cism operates on multiple structural levels simultaneously;
thus, an urban community of color that lacks healthy food will
likely also face housing inequalities, health disparities, sub-
standard education, and overrepresentation in the criminal
justice system, as well as a lack of structural power to alter
these injustices."2 1 5
Remedying food deserts and other food oppression issues
are but a few of the many important steps the state can take to
roll back the systemic obstacles that minority communities
face. Moving forward, "comprehensive change must include a
combination of community-based solutions and elimination of
racism from the structural levels of our food system."2 1 6
The government can start to rectify the impacts of institu-
tionalized racism on the food sustainability of urban communi-
ties in several ways. For instance, policymakers can work to
eliminate practices that have historically "provid[ed] public as-
sistance that is insufficient to cover the cost of fresh food," or
zoning and incentive policies "that favor corporations over com-
munity-based businesses and urban farming." 2 17 They can
also eliminate government subsidies that facilitate the satura-
tion of urban communities and schools with fast food. 2 18 By
taking these steps, the state humanizes residents of histori-
cally disadvantaged communities, laying necessary ground-
work for dignity restoration. 2 19
Community music and arts initiatives play a particularly
important role in rebuilding the vitality of traditionally disad-
vantaged urban neighborhoods. 2 2 0 The arts have long been a
way for marginalized communities to express their discontent
214 Id. at 106.
215 Id. at 101-02.
216 Id. at 136.
217 Id. at 110.
218 Id.
219 Id. (referring to illusory distinctions between public and private spheres of
action and suggesting that structural racism "severely limits the ability to exercise
choice" (quoting Andrea Freeman, Fast Food: Oppression Through Poor Nutrition,
95 CALIF. L. REV. 2221, 2222 (2007)).
220 See Alan Kay, Art and Community Development: The Role the Arts Have in
Regenerating Cornunities, 35 COMMUNrry DEv. J. 414, 423 (2000).
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with institutional oppression while reinforcing feelings of dig-
nity and self-worth. 22 1 For example:
It is within [the] historical context [of urban renewal] that hip
hop developed from urban Black and Latino youth, who were
essentially abandoned and rendered invisible by both White
and Black politicians alike and the dominant public dis-
course. Isolated and ignored, in what was categorized by
most as a dying city, these youth decided to celebrate, and to
live, despite the deteriorating conditions around them,
through the beat-the first element and manifestation of hip
hop culture. 222
Even today, community music programs are springing up
in neighborhoods touched by eminent domain, such as the
Heritage School of Music in New Orleans. Situated in the
Treme, the Heritage School of Music reinforces the role of mu-
sic and culture in the lives of local youth, and provides impor-
tant employment opportunities for local musicians. 22 3 These
music schools and similar efforts help encourage interpersonal
growth and thriving urban communities. 224 By partially fund-
ing these programs and providing venues to showcase and up-
lift performers, the state can use music and the arts as another
tool to restore dignity to disadvantaged populations. 2 25
More broadly, the restorative effect of the arts has long
been understood, and "[tihere is evidence to show that art, as a
medium, can enable individuals and groups to become more
employable, more involved, more confident and more active in
contributing to the development of their local communities." 2 26
By rallying isolated communities around a particular purpose,
the arts "can help with establishing or refashioning civic iden-
221 See id. at 416 ([Plarticipation in the arts can improve self-confidence and
self-identity and ... can greatly add to social development within communities.
This is particularly evident in cases where those most marginalized and disadvan-
taged [are] encouraged to participate." (citing FRANQOIS MATARASSO, USE OR ORNA-
MENI? THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ARTs (1997))).
222 Akilah N. Folami, From Habermas to "Get Rich or Die Tryin": Hip Hop, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the Black Public Sphere, 12 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 235, 256-57 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
223 See Heritage School of Music Program History, NEw ORLEANS JAZZ & HERI-
TAGE FESTIVAL & FOUND., INC., https://www.jazzandheritage.org/what-we-do/heri
tage-school-of-music-program-history [https://perma.cc/5H6R-A8YD].
224 See Kay, supra note 220, at 416 ("[Clommunity arts projects can impact
positively on . . . community regeneration." (citing FRANQOIS MATARASSO, VITAL
SIGNS: MAPPING COMMUNITY ARTS IN BELFAST (1998)).
225 See id. at 414-15 ("In run-down, economically and socially depressed areas
community development workers often have to look at a range of tools that will
enable local people to engage together, develop social and economic skills and
assume the power to fashion their own future.").
226 Id. at 415.
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tity . .. and give voice not only to feelings of loss and despair,
but also to quicken hope and instill pride in a shared heri-
tage." 227 Consider the impact of the arts on feelings of self-
worth. Studies have long shown that: "children who have
taken three years of music instruction have higher self-esteem
than their counterparts." 228 What is more, studies have found
that "the arts stimulate learning in core subjects while encour-
aging creativity, benefiting overall learning." 2 2 9 In the broader
community, as in schools, the arts provide an outlet to facili-
tate the process of dignity restoration.
Recognizing the dignitary value of the arts is particularly
important given that government support for arts and humani-
ties programs has continually decreased. 2 3 0 Despite research
showing "that students who take electives such as foreign lan-
guage or music[ ] perform better on core subjects,"23 1 many
schools have cut such programs in order to allocate more fund-
ing towards preparation for standardized testing.232 Although
success on standardized tests is important, declining support
for the arts "deprives children of a balanced education, as stud-
ies repeatedly show the positive relationship between the arts
and academic success."2 3 3
Indeed, "[tihe arts have the power to address cultural and
communal needs in ways and to a depth that few other ap-
proaches can claim." 2 34 Especially for children who have been
overlooked by traditional forms of education, exposure to the
arts is a route to success that makes a difference "not just in
[individual] cultural literacy, but in their self-esteem, their aca-
demic achievement, their sense of our global heritage and their
readiness for the workforce." 235 Given these rehabilitative ben-
efits, viewing the arts as a government obligation rooted in the
just compensation requirement, rather than as a superfluous
burden, has the potential to change this destructive para-
227 Max Stephenson Jr., Developing Community Leadership Through the Arts in
Southside Virginia: Social Networks, Civic Identity and Civic Change, 42 CoMMuNnY
DEV. J. 79, 83 (2007).
228 Ryan S. Vincent, No Child Left Behind, Only the Arts and Humanities:
Emerging Inequalities in Education Fifty Years After Brown, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 127,
149 (2004).
229 Id.
230 See Hernandez & Rios, supra note 208, at 272.
231 Vincent, supra note 228, at 148.
232 See id. at 143.
233 Id. at 142.
234 Stephenson Jr., supra note 227, at 83.
235 Vincent, supra note 229, at 148-49 (quoting Wynton Marsalis, Artistic
Director, Jazz at the Lincoln Center, Address at National Press Club Luncheon
With Wynton Marsalis (Sept. 22, 2003)).
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digm.23 6 The government can use community-based arts pro-
grams hand-in-hand with wider community development
initiatives to successfully empower individuals uprooted by
eminent domain.237
As these examples illustrate, organic forms of community
growth and healing have already "capture[d] the degree to
which communit[y] [support] can foster dignity, self-worth, and
even autonomy." 2 38 But amplifying these initiatives through
government support can greatly speed up these positive out-
comes. After decades of stale just compensation jurispru-
dence, courts should not hesitate to creatively approach
historical and structural injustices.
For example, courts can support long-term, dignity-restor-
ing initiatives by ordering the creation of constructive trusts
intended to benefit the community. 23 9 These trusts could eas-
fly be structured to require continuous financial support for
certain community initiatives. Thus, on top of a damage award
for the fair market value of seized property, a court might order
that additional damages be paid into a constructive trust and
that the interest that accrues on that trust be paid yearly to a
particular community institution.240 Or a court might order
the creation of a grant-making, charitable trust, with the initial
damages serving as seed money for annual grants required to
be made to community nonprofits or small businesses. 24 1 Re-
medial schemes can be creative, and by beginning to reimagine
236 This Note takes no position on whether budget cuts to arts and humanities
programs are themselves Takings.
237 See Kay, supra note 220, at 422-23.
238 Gilman, supra note 123, at 758-59.
239 Cf. Kimberly Breedon & A. Christopher Bryant, Restoring Trust with Trusts:
Constructive and Blind Trusts As Remedies for Presidential Violations of the Consti-
tution's Emoluments Clauses, 11 ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 284, 299-300 (2018) ("Cases
in areas of law outside the Emoluments Clause context bear out the notion that
the constructive trust is an appropriate remedy for corruption by public officials,
regardless of whether the public till suffers any actual loss."); John H. Langbein,
The Contractartan Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 631 & nn.28-29
(1995) (discussing constructive trusts as an equitable remedy analogous to ex-
press trusts).
240 Analogous schemes already exist. Consider Community Development En-
tities (CDEs), "financial intermediaries through which private capital flows from
an investor to a qualified business located in a low-income community." See U.S.
DEP'T TREASURY CMTY. DEV. FIN. INSTS. FUND, NEW MIKTS. TAx CREDIT PRO-
GRAM, FACT SHEET 1 (2018), https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/NMTC%20
Fact%20SheetJan2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/LA8T-UJWW1. Unlike the trusts
this Note proposes, CDEs secure initial capital for later reinvestment by offering
tax credits to investors. See id. at 1-2.
241 See EDITH L. FISCH ET AL., CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 173-74
(1974) (indicating that a charitable trust may arise by constructive trust).
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just compensation as more than fair market value, the Su-
preme Court can set the tone from the top down. 2 4 2
To be clear, dignity restoration does not necessarily require
the state to establish a certain minimum level of welfare for all
citizens. 243 However, true respect for dignity demands "that all
citizens possess certain capabilities, such as the capability to
live a safe, well-nourished, productive, educated, social, and
politically and culturally participatory life of normal length."244
These capabilities comprise the minimum, material precondi-
tions of human dignity, and the state's obligation to ensure
those preconditions arises from the fundamental constitutional
duty to provide just compensation for takings that have
stripped communities of that dignity. 24 5
Ultimately, a mere shift in tone may go a long way. If we
reframe Bern's right to eliminate blight as "a right of individ-
uals to beautiful cities (or communities)," we open the door for
new understandings of just compensation to take hold.2 4 6 In
this manner, comprehensive community growth strategies can
further fundamental constitutional goals by expanding oppor-
tunities for those living in segregated, disadvantaged neighbor-
hoods, and by counteracting disinvestment and blight as
barriers to more integrated living patterns. 2 47 Whether
through judicial, legislative, or executive action, government
investments in the quality of urban life will help to balance the
Takings Clause and restore the dignity taken from thousands
of Americans by decades of discriminatory eminent domain
practices.
CONCLUSION
Longstanding calls for the Supreme Court to revisit the
Takings Clause's just compensation requirement are especially
relevant in light of urban renewal's destructive history. How-
ever, the just compensation requirement should be viewed as a
floor, not as a ceiling. Even in the absence of formal action by
courts, legislatures and local governments can act to fulfill the
242 The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that determining the meaning
ofjust compensation, as a matter of law, is a judicial function. See Ely, Jr., supra
note 13, at 16.
243 See Bracey, supra note 122, at 26.
244 Id. (emphasis added).
245 See id. at 26-27.
246 See Barron M. Flood, Note, "Every Sort of Interest": Penn Central and the
Right to Comnmunity-Making Places, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 767, 784 (2017).
247 Seicshnaydre, supra note 78, at 668.
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government's constitutional obligation of "full and perfect"
compensation. 2 4 8
By taking preemptive action to support community-based
initiatives, financially as well as politically, the same legisla-
tures that seized and destroyed urban neighborhoods can be-
gin to set things right. Court-ordered investments in the long-
term well-being of urban communities can further recognize
and remedy the dignitary harms inflicted by eminent domain.
These state-backed actions are crucial steps towards ensuring
the equal dignity to which all are entitled.
Undoubtedly, policies may "follow our compassion." 2 4 9
But equally, some policies may be constitutionally required.
Just compensation is one such obligation. Far from frivolous,
just compensation is integral to our constitutional order.
Courts, legislatures, and other government actors need to fol-
low where the Constitution has already led, and begin to recon-
sider the meaning of the just compensation requirement.
Thinking of justice as more than just money is a good start.
248 See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326
(1893).
249 See Albright, supra note 1.
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